security-triage

name security-triage description Triage OpenClaw security advisories, drafts, and GHSA reports with shipped-tag and trust-model proof. Security Triage Use when reviewing OpenClaw security advisories, drafts, or GHSA reports. Goal: high-confidence maintainers' triage without over-closing real issues or shipping unnecessary regressions. Close Bar Close only if one of these is true: duplicate of an existing advisory or fixed issue invalid against shipped behavior out of scope under SECURITY.md fixed before any affected release/tag Do not close only because main is fixed. If latest shipped tag or npm release is affected, keep it open until released or published with the right status. Required Reads Before answering: Read SECURITY.md . Read the GHSA body with gh api /repos/openclaw/openclaw/security-advisories/<GHSA> . Inspect the exact implicated code paths. Verify shipped state: git tag --sort=-creatordate | head npm view openclaw version --userconfig "$(mktemp)" git tag --contains <fix-commit> if needed: git show <tag>:path/to/file Search for canonical overlap: existing published GHSAs older fixed bugs same trust-model class already covered in SECURITY.md Review Method For each advisory, decide: close keep open keep open but narrow Default to one advisory at a time when comments/closures are involved: Review exactly one GHSA. Print the GHSA URL first. Summarize the decision and evidence for discussion. Draft one maintainer-ready comment. Copy only that one comment to the clipboard. Stop and wait for Peter to post/discuss before moving to the next GHSA. Do not batch multiple close comments unless Peter explicitly asks for a batch. Check in this order: Trust model Is the prerequisite already inside trusted host/local/plugin/operator state? Does SECURITY.md explicitly call this class out as out of scope or hardening-only? Shipped behavior Is the bug present in the latest shipped tag or npm release? Was it fixed before release? Exploit path Does the report show a real boundary bypass, not just prompt injection, local same-user control, or helper-level semantics? If data only moves between trusted workspace-memory files called out in SECURITY.md , do not treat "injection markers" alone as a security bug. In that case, frame sanitization as optional hardening only if it preserves expected memory workflows. Functional tradeoff If a hardening change would reduce intended user functionality, call that out before proposing it. Prefer fixes that preserve user workflows over deny-by-default regressions unless the boundary demands it. Hardening follow-up Even when the GHSA should close, ask whether a narrow hardening change would reduce footguns without changing the documented trust boundary. Separate hardening from vulnerability status. Phrase it as "not required for GHSA closure, but worth considering". Bring up hardening only if it is concrete, low-risk, and preserves intended maintainer/operator workflows. If hardening would require a product/security model change, say that explicitly and do not imply it is a required fix for closure. Response Format When preparing a maintainer-ready close reply: Print the GHSA URL first. Then draft a detailed response the maintainer can post. Include: exact reason for close exact code refs exact shipped tag / release facts fix provenance or canonical duplicate GHSA when applicable optional hardening note only if worthwhile and functionality-preserving Keep tone firm, specific, non-defensive. Public Wording Hygiene Keep raw commit hashes, PR titles/numbers, and fix-mechanism summaries out of public advisory text. Use the patched release/version field only. Keep exact commit SHAs, PRs, and implementation notes in internal notes and verification files. For hardening/no-publish outcomes, do not add exploit-heavy details, "Fixed by" text, or a "Fix Commit(s)" section. Thank reporters, preserve credit, state the SECURITY.md boundary, and say clearly that the GHSA will close without publication. For published CVE/GHSA text, prefer ### Patched Versions with the fixed release. Do not explain how the patch works unless Peter explicitly asks for that public detail. Keep GHSA ids out of changelog and release-note wording unless Peter explicitly asks. Discussion Mode When Peter is manually posting GHSA comments, use this flow: Show the URL. Give a terse verdict ( close , keep open , or keep open but narrow ). List the strongest evidence bullets. State any optional hardening follow-up separately from the close reason. Copy the proposed comment body with pbcopy . End the reply after the one advisory. Do not continue to the next advisory until Peter says to continue. If the GitHub API cannot post comments for private advisories, say so once and keep using clipboard/UI paste. Clipboard Step After drafting the final post body for the current advisory, copy it: pbcopy << 'EOF' <final response> EOF Tell the user that the clipboard now contains the proposed response for that advisory. Useful Commands gh api /repos/openclaw/openclaw/security-advisories/<GHSA> gh api /repos/openclaw/openclaw/security-advisories --paginate git tag -- sort =-creatordate | head -n 20 npm view openclaw version --userconfig " $(mktemp) " git tag --contains <commit> git show <tag>:<path> gh search issues --repo openclaw/openclaw --match title,body,comments -- "<terms>" gh search prs --repo openclaw/openclaw --match title,body,comments -- "<terms>" Decision Notes “fixed on main, unreleased” is usually not a close. “needs attacker-controlled trusted local state first” is usually out of scope. “same-host same-user process can already read/write local state” is usually out of scope. “trusted workspace memory promotes/reindexes trusted workspace memory” is usually out of scope unless it crosses a documented boundary. “helper function behaves differently than documented config semantics” is usually invalid. If only the severity is wrong but the bug is real, keep it open and narrow the impact in the reply.